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Abstract—This paper proposes a jointly cooperative relay and
jamming protocol based on full-duplex (FD) capable relay to
increase the source-destination secrecy rate in the presence of
different types of eavesdroppers. In this so called FD-Relay
with jamming (FDJ) protocol, the FD-Relay, first, simultaneously
receives data and sends jamming to the eavesdropper, and, then,
forwards the data, while the source jams the eavesdropper.
Achievable secrecy rates of the proposed FDJ in presence of
different eavesdropper types and self-interference (SI) are derived
and compared with those of the traditional half-duplex (HD)
relay. The adaptive power allocation for secrecy rate maximiza-
tion in a multi-carrier scenario for both proposed FDJ and
HD-Relay is formulated as a non-convex optimization problem
and corresponding iterative solution algorithm is developed using
the difference-of-two-concave-functions (DC) programming tech-
nique. The simulation results confirm that FDJ offers significant
improvements in the secrecy rate over the HD-Relay.
Index Terms—Full-duplex relay, physical-layer security.
I. INTRODUCTION
To improve the coverage and capacity of next-generation
wireless networks, relay has been recognized based on two
schemes: I) Half-duplex (HD) relaying where relay R receives
data from source S, then, R forwards data to the destination
(D); II) Full-duplex (FD) relaying where R receives and sends
simultaneously. The advantage of FD-Relay mode to increase
the spectral efficiency has been reported, e.g., [1], where the
performance comparison of FD and HD-Relay highly depends
on the self-interference (SI) of FD-Relay.
In addition, next-generation wireless networks deal with the
vulnerable broadcasting feature of wireless channels against
overhearing of eavesdroppers (E), where the secrecy rate is
chosen as the figure of merit, and defined as the difference
between the achieved S-D rate and eavesdropper overheard
rate [2]. Obviously, when S-D channel gain is lower than S-E
channel gain, the secrecy rate is zero, indicating unfavorable
interference-limited scenario [3]. In this context, to increase
the chance of non-zero secrecy rate, applying the HD-Relay
to increase S-D desired rate is a natural approach e.g., [4].
Also, it is well studied that the external jamming nodes can
be deployed to degrade the overheard rate [5], and also relay
and jamming nodes can jointly improve S-D secrecy rate, e.g.,
[6].
This paper aims to deploy the FD capability of relay
to propose the cooperative relay and jamming protocol to
increase the S-D secrecy rate, called FD-Relay with jamming
(FDJ) protocol. The benefits and even disadvantages of FD-
capable nodes on secrecy rate have been initiated in [3], [7].
We investigate the potential benefit of FD-Relay in improving
S-D secrecy rate where R concurrently increases S-D desired
rate and decreases the overheard rate of eavesdropper. In the
proposed FDJ, in the first time slot, the relay simultaneously
receives from S and sends jamming to E. Then, in the second
time slot, R forwards the data to D, while S sends jamming
to E, meaning that the FD-Relay offers jointly cooperative
transmission and jamming.
The achievable secrecy rate depends on the capability of
the eavesdroppers [4], categorized into two types: 1) Naive
eavesdropper who just extracts the information from either S or
R; and 2) Informed eavesdropper who decodes the information
from both S and R. We derive the secrecy rates of FDJ
for these two types which allow us to further establish the
conditions for non-zero secrecy rates for FDJ, and compare
the FDJ and HD-Relay secrecy rates. Our analysis indicates
that FDJ can improve the secrecy rate compared to the HD-
Relay and the level of SI has a strong influence on the FDJ
secrecy rates. We further investigate the FDJ power allocation
problems. Based on the difference-of-two-concave-functions
(DC) programming, we develop an efficient iterative algorithm
to solve these non-convex optimization problems. Simulation
results confirm the analytical results and show that the FDJ can
improve the secrecy rate up to twice that offered HD-Relay
for small level of SI.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the system model, followed by Section III where
a performance comparison analysis of FDJ and HD-Relay is
presented. Section IV contains the power allocation problems
and their solutions. Section V provides the simulation results
and Section VI concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
Consider a two-hop transmission between a single-antenna
S and D via a friendly FD-Relay R in the presence of E
shown in Fig. 1. The total bandwidth of B Hz allocated to S-D
transmission, is divided into K equal-bandwidth sub-carriers
forming K = {1, · · · ,K}. Assume that B/K is much less
than the channel coherence bandwidth so that the sub-carrier
frequency response is flat and represented by the channel
power gain hkXY for sub-carrier k over the X-Y link where
X ∈ {S,R} and Y ∈ {R,D,E}. Consequently, the overall
channel responses over the bandwidth B of X-Y link are
represented by hXY = [h1XY, · · · , hKXY].
The transmission frame consists of two equal time-slots
denoted by t = 1 and t = 2. The channel gains are assumed to
2Fig. 1. Operation in one transmit frame (a) HD-Relay and (b) FDJ.
be block fading. Also, we assume that hkSD ≈ 0 and R uses the
decode-and-forward (DF) strategy. In the HD-Relay protocol
illustrated in Fig. 1(a), in t = 1, the source transmits xk[t = 1]
to R over sub-carrier k where E{|xk[t = 1]|2} = P kS , E{.}
is the expectation operator, and P kS is transmit power of S on
sub-carrier k. The received signals at R and E from S on sub-
carrier k are, respectively, rkHD[t = 1] =
√
hkSRx
k[t = 1] + nkR
and ekHD[t = 1] =
√
hkSEx
k[t = 1] + nkE where nkR and nkE are
the white Gaussian noise samples at R and E, respectively
for all k ∈ K. Without loss of generality, we assume the
same noise power of σ at each receiver in all sub-carriers. In
t = 1, the signal-to-noise-power ratio (SNR) at R and E are
γkR(HD) =
PkS h
k
SR
σ
and γkSE(HD) =
PkS h
k
SE
σ
, respectively, for all
k ∈ K. In t = 2, R forwards fk[t = 2] to D, and the received
signals at D and E are ykHD[t = 2] =
√
hkRDf
k[t = 2] + nkD,
ekHD[t = 2] =
√
hkREf
k[t = 2] + nkE, respectively, where
E{|fk[t = 2]|2} = P kR , P
k
R is the transmit power of R on
sub-carrier k, and nkD is the white Gaussian noise samples at
D. At D, the SNR is γkD(HD) =
PkR h
k
RD
σ
, and, the SNR for the
HD-Relay with DF strategy is γkHD = min{γkR(HD), γkD(HD)},
for all k ∈ K [8]. In t = 2, the overheard SNR of E is
γkRE(HD) =
PkR h
k
RE
σ
. For the naive eavesdropper with only
listening capability without knowledge of relay operation, its
effective SNR is γk,1E = max{γkSE(HD), γkRE(HD)}, for all
k ∈ K, and consequently, the S-D secrecy rate in the case of
a naive eavesdropper is SR1 =
∑K
k=1 SR
k,1 where SRk,1 =
[log 2(1 + γkHD) − log 2(1 + γ
k,1
E )]
+
, and [x]+ = max{0, x}.
However, for an informed eavesdropper with knowledge of
relay operation, its effective SNR is γk,2E =
PkS h
k
SE
σ
+
PkR h
k
RE
σ
,
and consequently, the S-D secrecy rate in the case of an
informed eavesdropper is SR2 =
∑K
k=1 SR
k,2 where SRk,2 =
[log 2(1 + γkHD)− log 2(1 + γ
k,2
E )]
+
.
Using FDJ, in t = 1, S sends data to R, and, simultaneously,
R tries to jam the overhearing of E by sending artificial noise
f˜k[t = 1] where E{|f˜k[t = 1]|2} = P kR . Therefore, in time-
slot t = 1, the received signal at R is rk[t = 1] =
√
hkSRx
k[t =
1] +
√
hkSIf˜
k[t = 1] + nkR, for all k ∈ K, and its SINR is
γkR(t = 1) =
PkS (1)h
k
SR
σ+PkR (1)h
k
SI
where we use 1 to indicate t = 1
for brevity. In t = 2, S sends the artificial noise x˜k[t = 2]
to jam E and, simultaneously, R forwards the data to D. The
active links in t = 1 and t = 2 are depicted in Fig. 1 (b). The
received signal at D is yk[t = 2] =
√
hkRDf
k[t = 2] + nkD,
and, consequently, its SINR is γkD(t = 2) =
PkR (2)h
k
RD
σ
. Here,
we use 2 to indicate t = 2 for brevity. Consequently, SINR
of FDJ for the DF strategy, is γkFDJ = min{γkR(t = 1), γkD(t =
2)}. In this protocol, the overhearing signal of E in t = 1
and t = 2 are ek[t = 1] =
√
hkSEx
k[t = 1] +
√
hkREf˜
k[t =
1] + nkE, e
k[t = 2] =
√
hkSEx˜
k[t = 2] +
√
hkREf
k[t = 2] +
nkE, for all k ∈ K. For the naive eavesdropper, the overheard
SINR in t = 1 and t = 2 are γkSEJ(t = 1) =
PkS (1)h
k
SE
σ+PkR (1)h
k
RE
and γkREJ(t = 2) =
PkR (2)h
k
RE
σ+PkS (2)h
k
SE
. Consequently, we have γk,3E =
max{γkSEJ(t = 1), γ
k
REJ(t = 2)} for all k ∈ K. In this case, S-D
secrecy rate with a naive eavesdropper is SR3 =
∑K
k=1 SR
k,3
,
where SRk,3 = [log 2(1 + γkFDJ)− log 2(1+γ
k,3
E )]
+
. When the
eavesdropper is informed, assuming same codebook at S and
R, its overheard SINR is γk,4E =
PkS (1)h
k
SE
σ+PkR (1)h
k
RE
+
PkR (2)h
k
RE
σ+PkS (2)h
k
SE
,
and we have SR4 =
∑K
k=1 SR
k,4 where SRk,4 = [log 2(1 +
γkFDJ)− log 2(1+ γ
k,4
E )]
+
, for all k ∈ K. FDJ is similar to the
case with one friendly HD-Relay and one friendly jammer in
the network, except that here FD-Relay acts as both friendly
relay and jammer with SI.
III. PERFORMANCE COMPARISONS
In this section, we study the achievable secrecy rates of
FDJ, and compare them with HD-Relay. We first focus on
the single-carrier transmission scenario where the index k can
be dropped for simplicity without confusion. We also assume
no power allocation is applied to S and R, i.e., they transmit
at their maximum transmit power. Without loss of generality,
consider PmaxS = 1, and α = PmaxR /PmaxS . Let assume that
the noise is negligible compared to interference, e.g., σ ≪
PmaxR hSI and σ ≪ PmaxS hSE. As previously mentioned, one
concern for secrecy rate is that it might be zero depending on
the channel gains. In the following, we show how FDJ can
increase the chance of non-zero secrecy rate compared to the
HD-Relay protocol.
Non-Zero Secrecy Rate Conditions for a Naive Eavesdrop-
per: For the naive eavesdropper, by considering γ1E < γHD and
γ3E < γFDJ, the conditions to achieve non-zero secrecy rate for
the FD and HD-Relay protocols (i.e., for SR1 and SR3 > 0)
can be derived as follows:
C01: For HD-Relay, SR1 > 0, when hSE <
min{hSR, αhRD}, and hRE < min{hRD, hSRα }.
C02: For FDJ, SR3 > 0, when hSE <
min{hSRhRE/hSI, α
2hRDhRE/σ}, and hRE <
min{hRDhSE/σ, hSRhSE/α2hSI}.
From C01 and C02, when hSI < hRE or hSI < hSE, FDJ
increases the chance of non-zero secrecy rate compared to
that for HD-Relay protocol.
3Non-Zero Secrecy Rate Conditions for an Informed Eaves-
dropper: For an informed eavesdropper, by considering γ2E <
γHD and γ4E < γFDJ, the conditions to have SR
2 > 0 and
SR4 > 0 are:
C03: SR2 > 0 if hSE + αhRE < min{hSR, αhRD},
C04: SR4 > 0 if hSE
αhRE
+ αhRE
hSE
< min{ hSR
αhSI
, αhRD
σ
}.
It is obvious that when hSI ≤ min{hRE, hSE/α}, the chance
of non-zero secrecy rate is increased for FDJ.
Proposition 1: For a naive eavesdropper, FDJ achieves
higher secrecy rate than HD-Relay in the following cases
C11: hSR < αhRD+α2hRDhSI/σ, hSE > αhRE, and hSI <
hRE,
C12: hSR < αhRD + α2hRDhSI/σ, hSE ≤ αhRE, and
αhSI < hSE,
C13: hSR ≥ αhRD + α2hRDhSI/σ, and σ < hSE.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Proposition 2: For an informed eavesdropper, FDJ achieves
higher secrecy rate than HD-Relay in the following cases
C21: hSR < αhRD and hSI ≤ hRE × β
2+αβ
β2+α2 ,
C22: hSR ≥ αhRD and σhRE ≤
αβ(α+β)
(α2+β2) ,
where β = hSE
hRE
.
Proof: See Appendix B.
From C12 and C21, by adjusting α and β2+αβ
β2+α2 , the upper
bound for hSI is relaxed for naive and informed eavesdropper,
respectively. For example, if β ≈ 1, i.e., hSE ≈ hRE, and
α < 1, the bound of hSI in C21 is relaxed, which is the very
appealing from practical scenario for large hSI.
IV. POWER ALLOCATION PROBLEMS
The power allocation problem in a multi-carrier scenario
for HD- and FD- Relay protocols to maximize the secrecy
rate SRi under the S and R transmit power constraints can be
stated in a general form as follows
Oi : max
P≥0
SRi
s.t. C31 :
K∑
k=1
P kS ≤ P
max
S , C32 :
K∑
k=1
P kR ≤ P
max
R ,
where i = 1, · · · , 4 and P = [P 1S , · · · , PKS , P 1R , · · · , PKR ]
is the vector of transmit power of S and R for k ∈ K.
Each of the above optimization problems is non-convex and
encounter high computational complexity. For solving them
efficiently, we apply the following iterative algorithm based
on DC programming.
Consider the non-convex function θ(P) =
∑K
k=1 f
k(P) −
gk(P) where fk(P) and gk(P) are the convex functions and
P(l) is the power allocation vector at iteration l = 0, 1, 2, · · · .
In this case, gk(P(l)) is replaced with its first order Taylor
expansion, i.e., g˜k(P(l)) ≈ gk(P(l − 1)) + ∇P(l−1)gk(P(l −
1)) [P(l)− P(l − 1)]T, where ∇P(l−1)gk(P(l − 1)) is the gra-
dient vector of gk(P(l − 1)) with respect to vector P(l − 1).
Now θ(P) can be approximated as
θ(P(l)) ≈
K∑
k=1
fk(P(l))− g˜k(P(l)). (1)
TABLE I
DC-BASED ITERATIVE ALGORITHM.
Initialization
Set 0 < ε≪ 1, l = 0 and P(l = 0) as any feasible power
vector;
Iterations: For a given P(l), execute three steps below:
Step 1: Compute convex approximation from (1);
Step 2: Solve the convex approximation and derive an
optimal solution P(l);
Step 3: If ‖P(l)−P(l− 1)‖ ≤ ε, stop. Otherwise, l = l+1
and go back to Step 1.
Now the right-hand side of (1) is the convex function since
g˜k(P(l)) is linear function of P(l). The general DC-based
iterative algorithm is given in Table I. In the following, we
show that how this iterative algorithm can be applied to each
of our specific optimization problems.
We first consider FDJ protocol for a naive eavesdropper
with the following optimization problem O3
max
P≥0
K∑
k=1
(
log 2(1 + min{γkR(t = 1), γ
k
D(t = 2)})) (2)
− log 2(1 + max{γkSEJ(t = 1), γ
k
REJ(t = 2)})
)
s.t. C31 and C32.
We rewrite (2) as
max
π>0,̟>0,P≥0
K∑
k=1
(πk −̟k) (3)
s.t. C31, and C32,
C33 : log 2(1 + γkR(t = 1)) ≥ πk,
C34 : log 2(1 + γkD(t = 2)) ≥ πk
C35 : log 2(1 + γkSEJ(t = 1)) ≤ ̟k,
C36 : log 2(1 + γkREJ(t = 2)) ≤ ̟k,
where π = [π1, · · · , πK ] and ̟ = [̟1, · · · , ̟K ]. To use
the algorithm in Table I, the convexified version of (3) for
iteration l is
max
π>0,̟>0,P(l)≥0
K∑
k=1
(πk −̟k) (4)
s.t. C31, and C32,
C43 : πk ≤ fkR (P(1, l))− gkR(P(1, l− 1))−
∂gkR(P(1, l− 1))
∂P kR
(P kR (1, l)− P
k
R (1, l− 1)),
C44 : πk ≤ fkD(P(2, l)),
C45 : fkSE(P(1, l))− gkSE(P(1, l − 1))
−
∂gkSE(P(1, l− 1))
∂P kR
(P kR (1, l)− P
k
R (1, l− 1)) ≤ ̟
k,
C46 : fkRE(P(2, l))− gkRE(P(2, l − 1))
−
∂gkRE(P(2, l − 1))
∂P kS
(P kS (2, l)− P
k
S (2, l − 1)) ≤ ̟
k,
4where the functions related to C43-C46 are
fkR (P(1, l)) = log 2(σ + P kR (1, l)hkSI + P kS (1, l)hkSR),
fkSE(P(1, l)) = log 2(σ + P kR (1, l)hkRE + P kS (1, l)hkSE),
fkRE(P(2, l)) = log 2(σ + P kR (2, l)hkRE + P kS (2, l)hkSE),
fkD(P(2, l)) = log 2(1 +
P kR (2, l)h
k
RD
σ
),
gkR(P(1, l− 1)) = log 2(σ + P kR (1, l− 1)hkSI),
gkSE(P(1, l− 1)) = log 2(σ + P kR (1, l− 1)hkRE),
gkRE(P(2, l− 1)) = log 2(σ + P kS (2, l− 1)hkSE).
where P kX (1, l) and P kX (1, 2) are the transmit power of X =
{S,R} at t = 1 and t = 2 for sub-carrier k at iteration l,
respectively; and we have P(1, l) = {P 1X(1, l), · · ·PKX (1, l)}
and P(1, 2) = {P 1X(1, 2), · · ·PKX (1, 2)}. The optimization
problem O4, related to FDJ for an informed eavesdropper,
is
max
π>0,̟>0,P(l)≥0
K∑
k=1
(πk −̟k), (5)
s.t.: C31, C32, C33, C34,
C38: log 2(1 + γk,6E ) ≤ ̟
k.
Here, again, we can utilize C43 and C44 to transform (5) into
its convex approximation. Therefore, the DC-approximation of
above problem for iteration l is
max
π≥0,̟≥0,P(l)≥0
K∑
k=1
(πk −̟k), (6)
s.t.: C31, C32,C43, C44 and C48,
where C48 is fk,4E (P(l)) − g
k,4
E (P(l − 1)) −
∂g
k,4
E (P(l−1))
∂PkR (1,l−1)
(P kR (1, l) − P
k
R (1, 1 − 1)) −
∂g
k,4
E (P(l−1))
∂PkS (2,1−1)
(P kS (2, l) − P
k
S (2, 1 − 1)) ≤ ̟
k
,
where fk,4E (P(l)) = log 2
(
(σ + P kR (1, l)h
k
RE)(σ +
P kS (2, l)h
k
SE) + (P
k
S (2, l)h
k
SE)(σ + P
k
S (2, l)h
k
SE) +
(P kR (1, l)h
k
RE)(σ + P
k
R (1, l)h
k
RE)
)
and gk,4E (P(l − 1)) =
log 2((σ + P kR (1, l− 1)h
k
RE)(σ + P
k
S (2, l − 1)h
k
SE)).
The formulations related to O3 and O4 can be used for
the optimization problems of the HD-Relay protocol for the
naive and informed eavesdropper, respectively, except that the
transmit power of R in t = 1 and the transmit power of S in
t = 2 must be set to zero.
V. ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES
To investigate the performances of FDJ, we conduct the
following simulations. In simulation setup, the channel gains
are assumed to be i.i.d. with Rayleigh-distributed, i.e., hkXY =
CN (0, 1/dςXY) for each k ∈ K where dXY is the distance
between X and Y, ς = 4 is the path-loss exponent. The
location of S, R and D are on (0, 0), (1, 0) and (2, 0), and
E is located between S and R and dSE = dRE. The SR-to-SE
distance ratio, dSR/dSE, is used as a reference parameter in
presenting the simulation results. We set K = 16, ε = 0.001
for the algorithm in Table I, and PmaxS = PmaxR = 5 unless
otherwise stated. We compare the performance of FDJ and
HD-Relay. The secrecy rate for each scheme is measured
during each transmission frame, and the results are derived
from the average over 1000 channel realizations.
In Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), SR1, SR2, SR3 and SR4 versus dSR
dSE
and ρ are shown, respectively. We see that with increasing
dSR
dSE
, decreasing hSR
hSE
, the secrecy rate is decreased. From Fig.
2(a), when dSR
dSE
≤ 0.5 and ρ ≥ 0.3, e.g., C11 and C12 in
Proposition 1 do not hold. Consequently, the FDJ secrecy rate
is lower than those of HD-Relay.
As shown in Figs. 2(a) and 2(b), SR3 and SR4 are much
less sensitive to dSR
dSE
than the secrecy rate for HD-Relay. This
is because, FDJ can adjust its transmit power at t = 1 and
t = 2 such that the secrecy rate is maintained even for large
hSE, i.e., dSRdSE = 1.1.
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Fig. 2. FDJ and HD-Relay secrecy rates versus dSR
dSE
for various values of ρ
and (a) naive eavesdropper and (b) informed eavesdropper.
Comparing Fig. 2(a) and Fig. 2(b) shows that SR4 is
much more sensitive to ρ than SR3, as we expected from
Propositions 1-2, i.e., the upper bound of hSI in C11 and C12
are more relaxed compared ro the upper bound of hSI in C21.
Also, Fig. 2(a) shows that for ρ ≥ 0.3, HD-Relay achieve
a better secrecy rate than FDJ, which is in line with C21 in
Proposition 2, i.e., when hSI ≥ hRE × β
2+αβ
β2+α2 , SR
4 < SR2.
Figs. 3(a)-3(b) depict the effects of increasing PmaxS on FDJ
secrecy rate via parameters ηS = SR
3
[SR3]PmaxS =5
as a normalized
5secrecy rate. As shown in Fig. 3(a), SR3 is not interference-
limited, which is a desirable feature of FDJ. However, shown
in Fig. 3(b), PmaxS does not have considerable effect on the
decreasing or increasing SR4.
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Fig. 3. FDJ ηS versus PmaxS for (a) naive eavesdropper and (b) informed
eavesdropper.
VI. CONCLUSION
We studied the secure transmission between the source, the
relay with full-duplex (FD) capability, and the destination in
the presence of the informed or naive eavesdroppers. We pro-
posed FD with jamming (FDJ) protocol where first, FD-Relay
receives the data and sends the jamming to eavesdropper,
and, then, the FD-Relay sends the data to destination while
source jams the eavesdropper. Via the analysis and simulation
results, the achieved secrecy rates of the proposed FDJ and
conventional half-duplex (HD)-Relay protocols are compared.
In summary, the achieved secrecy rate of FDJ can be up to
twice that of HD-Relay for small level of self interference (SI)
of FD transmission.
s
A. Proof of Proposition 1
From assumptions in Section III, γR(t = 1) = hSR/αhSI,
γD(t = 2) = αhRD/σ, γSEJ(t = 1) = hSE/αhRE, γREJ(t =
2) = hRE/αhSE, γR(HD) = hSR/σ, γD(HD) = αhRD/σ,
γSE(HD) = hSE/σ,and γRE(HD) = hRE/σ. We want to
derive the conditions for SR3 > SR1. When hSR < αhRD +
α2hRDhSI/σ, γFDJ = min{γR(t = 1), γD(t = 2)} = γR(t =
1) = hSR/αhSI. If hSE > αhRE, γ3E = max{γSEJ(t =
1), γREJ(t = 2)} = γSEJ(t = 1) = hSE/(αhRE), SR3 =
log 2(hSRhRE
hSIhSE
) and SR1 = log 2(hSR
hSE
). When hSI < hRE,
log 2(hSRhRE
hSIhSE
) > log 2(hSR
hSE
), i.e., C11. If hSE ≤ αhRE,
γ3E = max{γSEJ(t = 1), γREJ(t = 2)} = γREJ(t =
1) = log 2(αhRE/hSE). Therefore, SR3 = log 2( hSRhSEα2hSIhRE ) and
SR1 = log 2( hSR
αhRE
). To have log 2( hSRhSE
α2hSIhRE
) > log 2( hSR
αhRE
),
we should have hSI < hSE/α, i.e., C12. When hSR < αhRD +
α2hRDhSI/σ, γFDJ = min{γR(t = 1), γD(t = 2)} = γD(t =
2) = αhRD/σ. If hSE ≤ αhRE, SR3 = log 2(hRDασ ×
αhRE
hSE
)
and for the HD-Relay, SR1 = log 2(hRDα
σ
× σ
hSE
). Now, for
SR3 > SR1, we must have αhRE > σ. From hSE ≤ αhRE, the
latter inequality is transformed into σ < hSE. If hSE > αhRE,
SR3 = log 2(hRDα
σ
× αhRE
hSE
) and SR1 = log 2(hRDα
σ
× σ
hSE
). If
σ < αhRE, SR3 > SR1. Since hSE > αhRE, we should have
σ < hSE. Therefore, C13 is derived.
B. Proof of Proposition 2
We want to derive the conditions for SR4 > SR2.
Now, γ4E =
hSE
αhRE
+ αhRE
hSE
= β
α
+ α
β
. If hSR < αhRD,
SR4 = log 2( hSD
αhSIγ4E
) and SR2 = log 2(αhRD
σ
× σ
αhRE+hSE
). For
SR4 > SR2, we need log 2( hSD
αhSIγ4E
) > log 2(αhRD
σ
× σ
αhRE+hSE
).
With some rearrangements, C21 is derived. If hSR ≥ αhRD,
SR4 = log 2(αhRD
σγ4E
) and SR1 = log 2(αhRD
σ
× σ
αhRE+hSE
). For
SR4 > SR1, we need log 2( hSD
αhSIγ4E
) > log 2(αhRD
σ
× σ
αhRE+hSE
).
With some rearrangements, C22 is derived.
REFERENCES
[1] D. Ng, E. Lo, and R. Schober, “Dynamic resource allocation in MIMO-
OFDMA systems with full-duplex and hybrid relaying,” IEEE Transac-
tions on Communications, vol. 60, no. 5, pp. 1291–1304, May 2012.
[2] A. D. Wyner, “The wire-tap channel,” Bell Syst. Tech. J., vol. 54, no. 8,
pp. 1355 –1387, October 1975.
[3] G. Zheng, I. Krikidis, J. Li, A. Petropulu, and B. Ottersten, “Improving
physical layer secrecy using full-duplex jamming receivers,” IEEE Trans-
actions on Signal Processing, vol. 61, no. 20, pp. 4962–4974, October
2013.
[4] L. Dong, Z. Han, A. Petropulu, and H. Poor, “Improving wireless physical
layer security via cooperating relays,” IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, vol. 58, no. 3, pp. 1875–1888, March 2010.
[5] Z. Han, N. Marina, M. Debbah, and A. Hjorungnes, “Physical layer
security game: How to date a girl with her boyfriend on the same table,” in
International Conference on Game Theory for Networks, 2009. GameNets
’09., 2009, pp. 287–294.
[6] N. Mokari, S. Parsaeefard, H. Saeedi, and P. Azmi, “Cooperative secure
resource allocation in cognitive radio networks with guaranteed secrecy
rate for primary users,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications,
vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 1058–1073, February 2014.
[7] A. Mukherjee and A. Swindlehurst, “A full-duplex active eavesdropper in
MIMO wiretap channels: Construction and countermeasures,” in Confer-
ence Record of the Forty Fifth Asilomar Conference on Signals, Systems
and Computers (ASILOMAR), 2011, 2011, pp. 265–269.
[8] T. Riihonen, S. Werner, and R. Wichman, “Hybrid full-duplex/half-duplex
relaying with transmit power adaptation,” IEEE Transactions on Wireless
Communications, vol. 10, no. 9, pp. 3074–3085, September 2011.
